Lab report — email & DNSscan/perl.org

perl.org

Scanned Sep 6, 2026 12:29 UTC · 7 checks · public report

Health grade

Solid base — three policy steps remain.

BGrade B

3 warnings4 passing

In one line

Can perl.org be spoofed?

perl.org publishes DMARC with p=none — spoofed mail is monitored but not blocked.

WarningSPF

Finding 01

SPF ends in '~all' (softfail) rather than '-all' — acceptable for DMARC (non-pass either way); hardening to '-all' is optional and only safe once every legitimate sender is in the record

4 of 10 DNS lookups used

Current SPF

v=spf1 include:develooper.com ~all

All findings — worst first

WarningDMARCDMARC is recorded but p=none (monitoring only — no protection)
Start monitoring perl.org →
- no enforcement record is recommended yet — a scan alone could not confirm that your mail aligns (valid SPF and a DKIM signature), and moving off p=none without that evidence risks silently blocking legitimate mail. Gather aggregate-report evidence first, then step up: evidence before enforcement
- p=none only monitors — it does not block spoofing
- pct= is deprecated by RFC 9989; receivers ignore it — remove it at your next DNS edit
- no np= tag: non-existent subdomains fall back to sp/p — RFC 9989 §4.7's np=reject can protect them now
Current DMARC
v=DMARC1; p=none; pct=100; rua=mailto:[email protected]; sp=none; aspf=r; ruf=mailto:[email protected]

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Running your DNS diagnostic…

Can perl.org be spoofed?

SPF ends in '~all' (softfail) rather than '-all' — acceptable for DMARC (non-pass either way); hardening to '-all' is optional and only safe once every legitimate sender is in the record

All findings — worst first